EU ENLARGEMENT AS A FACTOR IN IRELAND’S NICE TREATY REFERENDUM

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INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath of the shock result of the Nice Treaty referendum in Ireland in June 2001 it was commonly stated that the result did not represent the electorate’s rejection of European Union (EU) enlargement. In fact both supporters and opponents of the Nice Treaty agreed wholeheartedly on this point. The Taoiseach (Irish Prime Minister) and his Foreign Minister assured their counterparts in the EU and the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) that purely domestic factors explained the result – enlargement had not been an issue. Opponents of the Treaty, similarly, couched every public statement with an insistence that they were in favour of enlargement. These claims were treated with some scepticism in the CEE candidate states. Not only would the result complicate the ongoing enlargement negotiations; it might postpone accession indefinitely.

This article has one central objective: it seeks to analyse the extent to which the issue of EU enlargement really mattered in the 2001 and 2002 Nice Treaty referendum campaigns and, more generally, in the evolving European debate in Ireland. The analysis proceeds through an examination of four crucial issue areas that figured prominently in the Nice Treaty campaign of 2001 and have remained to the fore in discussion at the National Forum on Europe throughout 2002. On each of these issues there exist profound disagreements between Ireland’s pro-Europeans and an emerging Euro-sceptic lobby. Analysis of each individual issue is set out against the contextual arguments deployed regarding enlargement. Further, it is contended the range of concerns expressed in Ireland about enlargement, whether with respect to institutional reform or policy issues, also exist in many other EU states. Indeed, fear and unease about the implications of enlargement permeate political discourse across the EU. This article begins by analysing the reaction to the shock 2001 referendum result across Europe.

REACTIONS

There was a strong linkage between the enlargement issue and the No vote in the analysis offered by candidate state governments in their reactions. For example, a Hungarian Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gabor Horvath, said, “We are convinced that the Irish politicians will do their best to explain and demonstrate to the Irish voters before the next enlargement the
benefits coming from enlargement.” The Polish foreign affairs spokesman added that he was confident “The EU, driven by feelings of responsibility and solidarity, will find a solution that will allow the Nice Treaty to come into force and create the structural framework for enlargement.” Milos Zeman, the Czech Premier, did not mince his words. He argued: “You cannot divide the individual parts of the referendum and that is why I am very, very sad indeed that my friends from Ireland, in fact, oppose enlargement.” Indeed, concern was so great among CEE states that the Taoiseach agreed to face the Polish media to explain what had happened after a direct request from his Polish counterpart at the Gothenburg Summit one week after the referendum was held. The evidence thus suggests that whatever the protestations to the contrary in Ireland, there was established a very clear and direct association in the CEE candidate states between the No vote in Ireland and a negative view to their accession to the EU.

The impression that enlargement was central to the No vote in Ireland took hold quickly in European capitals. Will Hutton made an explicit link between the No vote and enlargement: “Italy’s Berlusconi is openly sceptical about the costs of enlargement; the Irish voted against it in their referendum for the same reason.” George Soros, in an address in Budapest, suggested that one of the reasons Ireland rejected the Nice Treaty was “over fears aid to EU states would dwindle after eastern candidates joined.” Conservative MEP Daniel Hannan in London argued, “Asked to endorse a Treaty that would turn them into net contributors, Irish voters were unimpressed.” Another editorial asserted that “there is no reciprocal sense that Irish GDP having ballooned, a similar effort should now be made on behalf of Eastern Europe. Geo-politics and geo-gratitude do not go together, it seems.”

In the aftermath of the referendum result, almost every public statement from the Yes and No sides, from Cabinet ministers, interest groups, business organisations, and trade unions stressed that Ireland was not opposed to the enlargement of the EU. Indeed much political capital was spent on assuring all and sundry of Irish goodwill. Within weeks of the referendum, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was announcing new resident embassies in four EU candidate countries, “in a move designed to underline Ireland’s support for EU enlargement despite the rejection of the Nice Treaty.” Embassies are expected to be open in all of the candidate states by the end of 2003.

Senior government Minister Dermot Ahern acknowledged just how contentious was the issue of enlargement in Ireland. He insisted, “we need to convince people that enlargement is correct and that is one of the reasons why we have so many people coming here [to the Forum]…” The centrality accorded enlargement within the Forum’s discussions is thus acknowledged. Surely, if the No vote had not been about enlargement it would not have figured so prominently in the agenda and discourse of that body?

On the No side, campaigners from Sinn Fein, the Green Party, the National Platform and the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) all argued that their problems lay not with
enlargement but with the Nice Treaty and the direction of the European integration process more generally. Yet, analysis of their policy documents, public pronouncements and contributions to the Forum, yields a decided preoccupation with the issue of enlargement. Far from being accommodating of enlargement, most on the No side in fact seem to be decidedly uneasy about it, even if their rhetoric is couched in the language of solidarity and cooperation.

FOUR KEY ISSUES IN THE DEBATE

Having established that enlargement is of major significance in Ireland’s European conversation, the task is to determine the extent to which and exactly how enlargement influenced policy positions on the key EU issues before the electorate in Ireland in the run up to and after the 2001 referendum. The issues to be addressed here include economic competitiveness, the future of European agriculture and regional funding instruments, large-small state relations in an enlarging Union and immigration.

ECONOMIC ISSUES

It is clear that enlarging the EU eastwards represents a significant economic challenge for the current member states. On the one hand, they face the challenge of economic competition from the candidate states whilst simultaneously attempting to reconfigure the Union’s financial framework in a way that will benefit the candidate states whilst not unduly affecting current member states. This is especially important as “net contributors to the EU budget refuse to bear the brunt of enlargement expenses and net beneficiaries, on the other hand, argue that relatively poorer areas should not be disproportionately affected by enlargement.”

In the Irish context, these issues are particularly problematic. This is because the phenomenal Irish economic performance of the last decade has served to radically change the context in which economic policy is discussed. With Ireland now attaining a GDP per capita figure of circa €30,000 (second highest among the EU states), the dynamics of the economic relationship with the EU and the wider world have clearly changed. Like other EU states, the Irish view of enlargement will be determined to a large extent by expectations of changes in net welfare. In the Irish situation, however, this is even more the case because the benefits of EU membership have largely been seen to pivot around the issue of financial transfers from Brussels. The prospect of Ireland becoming a net contributor to the EU budget after 2006 and being replaced in the ‘subvention queue’ by the candidate states is one that has generated fierce debate. Such concerns are also of course visible in Spain, Portugal, and Greece, the EU states that have along with Ireland benefited most from EU structural and cohesion funding. The difference is that in Ireland the debate on the Nice Treaty has brought these issues firmly into the public domain.
Despite this, there has been an extraordinary consensus between government, business and even the trade unions in Ireland that the eastern enlargement of the Union represents a significant opportunity for the Republic to capture part of the emerging market in Eastern Europe. Enlargement is seen as low risk from this economic perspective. The key advocates of enlargement, not surprisingly, come from the business community. Foremost amongst them are the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC); the Construction Industry Federation; the Chambers of Commerce and various state agencies charged with economic development mandates such as the Industrial Development Authority (IDA) and Forfás.13 Also of note have been the contributions of individual companies with business interests in CEE and in the EU, some of whom were much more prominent in the 2002 referendum campaign, feeling threatened by the prospect of a second No vote on Nice. Similarly, government ministers and MEPs have continually sought to stress the future economic benefits that will accrue to Ireland as a result of enlargement. These pronouncements took on a new urgency after the 2001 referendum result.

The positive benefits of enlargement for Ireland are summed up by IBEC’s Maria Cronin:

“Our trade with countries that are candidates for EU membership has also grown exponentially from 1993, to current levels of more than €2 billion. In the context of EU enlargement, our trade with these countries has tremendous potential for growth. With economic growth rates exceeding that of the existing EU 15, any fears the EU may have of burdening itself with economic liabilities are not well founded.”14

For Irish business and employers, enlargement is thus of vital strategic importance. Negating the possibility of future threats related to enlargement, the IBEC asserts: “Some concerns have been expressed about Ireland’s potential to lose FDI [foreign direct investment] opportunities to the candidate countries. While some dynamic effects of integration can be expected, we believe that these will be more than out-weighed by the positive impacts of enlargement.”15 This picture of a relatively benign and perhaps very positive economic outcome to the enlargement process has been challenged only by a very limited number of academics.

One hugely significant issue for Ireland within the EU is tax policy. Indeed, Irish negotiators fought hard and successfully at Nice against the harmonisation of taxes at EU level. Ireland’s low level of corporation tax in particular has bestowed considerable advantages on it within the EU market and has been challenged by Germany, Belgium and other EU states that have much higher rates of corporation tax. Within Ireland, the low level of corporation tax is associated directly with success in attracting especially American FDI and thus the overall success of the economy. EU challenges to this regime are greeted with suspicion and fear.
Again, this is the context in which enlargement implications are considered. Economist Frank Barry noted that the Irish rate of corporation tax is about one third of the EU average.

“So last year Estonia abolished its rate of corporation tax. It has a zero rate of corporation tax, the maximum rate in Hungary is 18 per cent and various other countries like Slovenia and Latvia have rates that are substantially below the EU average, so they are following our success story. They are learning the lessons that our success story has to teach and they are following us down that road.”

Implicit here is the warning of being superseded by some at least of the candidate countries in the years ahead. Once the rate of corporation tax is reduced to a competitive level, these countries become a threat to Irish FDI flows. Another argument relates to cost competitiveness. Barry also argued “anybody who has been to CEE will know the spectacularly cheap prices and low wages that prevail there… Irish manufacturing costs per hour come in at 106 Swedish Krone per hour compared to the Czech Republic, which comes in at 27. So, there is a major difference in cost competitiveness.” And, although, as Barry points out, CEE productivity is (currently) low, Irish productivity is in great part a consequence of success at attracting multinationals: “so if the Czech Republic turns out to be very successful in attracting this FDI away from Ireland, their productivity statistics will look terrific a few years down the road compared to how they look now.” Thus the prospect of enlargement, which would herald full participation by the candidate countries in the EU single market, conjures up fear and insecurity in Ireland.

Economic arguments against enlargement, or at least those voicing scepticism on the grounds of perceived threats to the Irish economy, were present in both the 2001 and 2002 referendum campaigns and at the Forum on Europe. Anthony Coughlan, a leading Euro-sceptic and Secretary of the National Platform, introduced ideas about the ‘costs’ of enlargement. He mentioned “two million Polish farmers” and “business moving eastward, where wages are one third of ours, and eastward workers moving westward.” In a later letter to the same newspaper, Coughlan suggests enlargement might drive down the wages of Irish workers. And finally, Coughlan asks whether the government is making “contingency plans to meet the increased demand for housing, health and social welfare that will surely arise once word gets around Eastern Europe…” The implication here is obvious: enlargement represents an intolerable economic cost on incumbent EU countries. We stand to lose considerably from it. In similar vein, Coughlan’s ally within the Euro-sceptic lobby, Justin Barrett, suggested that if the treaty is passed, Ireland risks being forced to “send hundreds of millions of euro to Eastern Europe while schools and hospitals close here.” In a letter to The Irish Times in response to Coughlan, leading academic Tony Brown was in no doubt that the Euro-sceptics were “at last, revealing that opposition to enlargement is a key factor” in their opposition to the Nice Treaty.
These concerns about the impact of future enlargement of the EU are also now widely in evidence in media discourse. They are summed up succinctly by commentator Damien Kiberd:

“Could it be that voters do not want the Nice Treaty for other, more selfish reasons? Many farmers, for example, will not back Nice because they know it will cost the EU more to modernise Polish agriculture…than it currently costs to run the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Many trade unionists may silently wonder if it’s such a good thing to admit millions of Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Latvians, and Lithuanians to the EU –if they are going to exist as a reserve army of the unemployed willing to work for less than one euro an hour.”

AGRICULTURE AND STRUCTURAL FUNDING

As one of the EU states most dependent on agriculture, Ireland obviously has quite an interest in any reforms of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) connected with enlargement. Given the reliance of the CEE candidate states on agriculture, there will undoubtedly be significant changes to the CAP regime. This is likely to lead to a reduction in CAP transfers to Ireland and further pressure for higher contributions to the EU budget in the future to support the development of agriculture in CEE. Thus enlargement is the most important issue for Irish agricultural interests.

Whilst the main farming organisation, the Irish Farmers Association (IFA), has expressed public support for the enlargement process and government ministers similarly see a benign outcome, there does seem to exist an unease among farmers across the country about the direction of policy. In fact, some politicians attribute the failure to carry the Nice Treaty referendum in 2001 to the farmers who had previously supported EU referenda in Ireland but seemed to stay away in large number in 2001.

Ireland’s long-serving Minister for Agriculture, Joe Walsh, argues, “enlargement will alter the balance within the Council of Ministers in two ways, both of significance to Ireland.” First, there will occur a significant shift in the balance between larger and smaller member states in favour of the latter. Second, of the candidate countries, eight are more dependent on agriculture than Ireland, some of them very heavily dependent. “The agricultural interests in the Council will therefore be strengthened.” Walsh also stresses that enlargement does not represent a threat to Irish agricultural receipts from the CAP as:

“…the Berlin agreement explicitly specifies that expenditure earmarked for the existing member states cannot be used to meet the cost of enlargement. The resources necessary for
CAP market supports and for rural development in the existing EU, including Ireland, in the period to 2006 are therefore provided for and will not be affected by enlargement.”25

Notwithstanding these assurances, it is clear that a considerable degree of unease at the prospects of change can be evinced from the statements of many public representatives and spokespeople for farming organisations. Dana Rosemary Scallon MEP asks that the future of the CAP should be:

“…further discussed before the process of enlargement begins. The CAP budget cannot be increased, yet, according to the European Commission, the agricultural workforce in an enlarged Europe will double. However, there are 2.2 million farmers in Poland alone…. What preparations have been made for such a vast increase? Why has there not been an extensive discussion on the effects and cost of enlargement so as to ensure fairness and equity for all?”26

Another leading farming representative poses similar questions:

“We recognise the importance of accession to those twelve countries. There is significant economic and social disadvantage in most of the applicant countries, and in the long term, the European Union will be much better for their joining us. For now, we do require assurances that the objectives for agriculture and rural areas which are agreed in Agenda 2000 will be followed and will not be compromised in the enlargement and WTO negotiations.”28

To sum up the nature of the debate on agriculture, one has to note that the views of the main agricultural interest groups seem predicated on a view that the current CAP regime is certainly facing tremendous change but that the Berlin agreement ring fences current revenues for the immediate future. The prospect of enlargement, however, is one that is of deep concern to all groups. Similar concerns are expressed with respect to the future of the enlarged EU’s regional and structural funds. The fact that Ireland secured a relatively good deal in the 2000-2006 financial framework has meant that there has been little discussion of the possible impact of enlargement on the next framework. The Government acknowledges, however, “enlargement raises some contentious political issues,” none greater than on redistribution.29 Despite the ‘miracle’ of the Celtic Tiger, Ireland still received approximately €1.5 billion from the structural funds in 2001. The position will change radically after the negotiation of the next financial framework for 2006-11. Ireland will become a net contributor to the EU budget, with much of the structural aid being redirected to the newly joined CEE states. Accordingly, analysts expect that this issue will take on a great deal of importance when the new financial framework is being drawn up. And this will also be the case in Spain, Portugal, Greece and other EU member states. The position of Spain illustrates the point even more dramatically. Under the current regime, regions qualify for Objective One status if their GDP per capita is 75 per cent or less of the EU average. On that basis, 10 of Spain’s 17 regions between them obtained 63 per cent of the EU structural funds budget of €31.5 billion
in 2001. If that 75 per cent rule is unchanged, and if the EU’s average GDP per head is reduced by enlargement (as it inevitably will be with the accession of the CEE countries), only two of Spain’s poorest regions would then continue to qualify for aid. Thus, the enlargement issue takes on a crucial significance in the domestic politics of EU member states.

LARGE-SMALL STATE RELATIONS IN AN ENLARGING EU

A third important theme in current Irish EU discourse, and crucial to arguments about the Nice Treaty and future enlargement, has been that of power relations within the Union, particularly the relationship between large and small member states. Supporters and opponents of the Treaty have used enlargement to claim either a strengthening or diminution of small state power within the Union.

In Ireland, Euro-sceptics see enlargement as the excuse needed by large countries to push ahead with plans to form an inner core or avant garde. Anthony Coughlan, for example, suggested, “Nice permits this inner group of EU states effectively to hijack the EU institutions...for their own purposes and to confront the others thereafter with continual economic and political faits accomplis [sic].”30 Ultimately, Coughlan also believes that the EU project is a conspiracy of the larger states against the smaller ones, a new imperialism: “The EU is a product of attempts by the old empires of Europe to regain their place as superpowers --not as individual ones, but as a single, European one. Their power élites think like that, that’s their tradition.”31 Sinn Fein’s similar emphasis on enlargement as a vehicle for neo-imperialism is demonstrated by that party’s Aengus O Snodaigh’s comments at the Forum: “Romano Prodi or Joschka Fischer are the ones who are forcing their vision on most of the small countries in Europe.”32

Similarly, Roger Cole of the Euro-sceptic Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) was of the opinion, “…the British, the French, the Germans, the Italians and the rest of them lost their empires and now they are trying to create a European empire. In fact, Mr Prodi is on record as saying that he wants the EU to become a world power.”33 Suspicion, especially of German motives for arguing for changes in the institutional balance of the Union, abound. Thus we have a leading commentator, Kevin Meyers, railing against a future EU which “is either outside the central control of any state or, perhaps even worse, which could be subject to the control of one or two powerful states within the Union, most obviously France and Germany, both of which have historic pan-European missions.” Ireland is depicted here as one of the EU’s ‘vassal states’. Meyers goes on to “wonder whether or not the historical forces which once drove Germany and France are quite as extinct as the Euro-enthusiasts maintain.”34

Supporters of enlargement have stressed: (a) the over-representation of small states within the institutional structure simply had to be addressed before the accession of a large number of small CEE states and the ‘micro-states’ of Cyprus and Malta –otherwise EU business would
grind to a halt; and (b) the advantages for Ireland and other small states of the accession of similarly sized states from CEE. Nevertheless, the issue of large-small state relations was to the fore in both the 2001 and 2002 referendum campaigns and resonates strongly with public opinion.

IMMIGRATION

With the extraordinary growth in Irish living standards over the past decade, Ireland has become an attractive destination for migrants from Eastern Europe and Africa. Immigration, which hardly featured in earlier European debates, has suddenly become an issue of importance. And, what is striking is the way in which Euro-sceptics have sought to link immigration to EU enlargement in public discourse. Speculation about ‘floods of refugees’ and ‘armies of unemployed reserve labour’ migrating from East to West after enlargement have been introduced into the enlargement debate. These arguments have also surfaced in other EU states, notably Austria and Germany. Again, it is the prospect of enlargement that has helped polarise debate.

Under the EU Treaties and legislation, the free movement of persons is one of the fundamental freedoms of the Union. This confers rights of access to residency, employment, and equality of treatment for nationals of the member states across the EU. Weighing up the evidence, Forfás concludes:

“Ireland is highly unlikely to witness large migration flows from the new CEE entrants. On the contrary, in a situation in which Ireland is expected to need migrant labour in the medium to long term, some movement of labour from the accession countries to Ireland will be of benefit.”

Similarly, the Irish Government has sought to use studies by academic experts and the European Commission to underline its view that enlargement will not mean Ireland facing a large influx of immigrants after the first accessions take place. These assurances have been met with scepticism by elements of the Euro-sceptic lobby.

Anthony Coughlan, on behalf of the National Platform, accused the government of behaving irresponsibly by agreeing to unilaterally allow citizens of the candidate states full rights of free movement from the first day of their accessions to the Union. In a letter to The Irish Times, Coughlan suggested the real possibility of large-scale immigration into Ireland by nationals of Central and East European countries:
“While East European emigrants would naturally prefer to work in their neighbouring EU countries, when they find that their doors are shut for up to seven years, but that they can come to Ireland without work permits, are many not likely to do that? If one per cent of them do, it would be 750,000 people. If one-tenth of one per cent do, it would be 75,000.”36

Coughlan was accused by MEP Proinsias De Rossa of using the kind of language which the xenophobic right is using everywhere in Europe: “there are votes in it, and in my opinion Anthony Coughlan has decided quite deliberately and reprehensibly to provoke a xenophobic reaction to Nice.”37 Coughlan maintained that he was justified in raising the issue, even though he himself favoured enlargement.38 The spokesman for the No to Nice campaign, Justin Barrett, accused the government of being “reckless and irresponsible” on this issue. Alleging there will be a “flood” of workers, Mr Barrett said, “If you are in the Czech Republic you might prefer to go to Germany. But if Germany won’t let you in, you’ll go to Ireland.”39 The National Consultative Committee on Racism and Inter-culturalism (NCCRI) accused the No side of “alarmism”. The committee said the campaign’s use of emotive statements predicting a flood of workers coming to Ireland was “disturbing” and could cause “xenophobia and hostile attitudes” to immigrants to Ireland.40 Piaras MacEinri of the Irish Centre for Migration Studies asserted, “Mr Justin Barrett has finally laid bare the ugly face of his faction of the No to Nice campaign” and described this grouping as an “isolationist, xenophobic, backward-looking, far-right rump.”41 These exchanges on immigration again suggest that there is a great deal of uncertainty and unease in Ireland relating to Eastern enlargement of the Union.

CONCLUSIONS

Although it has been argued by both pro- and anti-Europeans that enlargement was not an issue during the 2001 and 2002 Nice Treaty referendum campaigns in Ireland, the evidence suggests in fact that enlargement did matter, that it underpinned concerns regarding the future operation of many EU policy areas and of course arguments about institutional reform. It was suggested that Irish perspectives on enlargement revolve essentially around fear and insecurity and, as such, are part of a qualitative change in contemporary Irish attitudes to European integration. Although all sides express support for the principle of enlargement, there is an undercurrent of concern about the prospects facing Ireland as a small state within a much expanded EU.

Does the Irish debate on the Nice Treaty help us to understand the broader perspectives on enlargement to be found throughout the EU? I argue that it does. Concern about the implications of the enlargement process manifests itself in similar (and of course different) ways in other member states of the EU. Whether with respect to economic issues, the future of the EU budget or wider questions of geopolitics in an enlarged Union, enlargement is a key
issue in the political discourse within member states. Ireland is the only EU state required to hold a referendum on the Nice Treaty. Thus, it is only in Ireland that concern about enlargement has really manifested itself openly. All of the evidence suggests that, had other EU states been required to hold referenda in order to ratify Nice, they would have found it similarly difficult to have the Treaty accepted, and that, as in Ireland, fears relating to enlargement would have been central issues in the debate. Thus, for all the talk of reunifying Europe, righting historical wrongs and the moral dimension to enlargement, there is still a long way to go before the candidate states are genuinely embraced and welcomed into the European family.

1 The referendum on the Nice Treaty, mandated by the Irish Constitution, was held on 7 June 2001. The turnout was 34.8 per cent and the result was a rejection of the Treaty by a margin of 54 to 46 per cent.

2 The Irish Government established the National Forum on Europe (NFOE) after the 2001 referendum. The Forum’s mandate was “to facilitate a broad discussion of issues relevant to Ireland’s membership of an enlarging Union and to consider the range of topics arising in the context of the debate on the Future of Europe” (NFOE, Chairman’s Report, 2002:5).

3 Quoted in The Independent, 10 June 2001.


7 The Daily Telegraph, 10 June 2001.


In 1972, Ireland’s per capita GDP stood at 58 per cent of the EEC average. The equivalent figure for Ireland’s per capita GDP in 2002 stood at 122 per cent.

Ireland’s national policy and advisory board for enterprise, trade, science, technology and innovation.

The Irish Times, 2 January 2002.


Ibid., p. 28.

The Irish Times, 24 June 2002.

The Irish Times, 9 July 2002.


The Irish Times, 7 July 2002.


In Ireland the agricultural sector accounts for 10 per cent of GDP and approximately 12 per cent of employment. Almost €6 billion of agricultural produce is exported annually.

Interview with Bernard Durkan TD, Chairman, Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) Committee on European Affairs, Dublin, 19 March 2002.


Emphasis added.


The Irish Times, 30 May 2001.


33       Ibid., p. 55.


36       The Irish Times, 26 August 2002.

37       The Irish Times, 13 July 2002.

38       The Irish Times, 22 August 2002.

39       The Irish Times, 7 August 2002.

40       The Irish Times, 8 August 2002.

41       The Irish Times, 10 August 2002.